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Abstract
We experimentally study the interaction of the effects of the strategic environment and com-
munication on the observed levels of cooperation in two-person finitely repeated games with a
Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We replicate previous findings that point to higher levels
of tacit cooperation under strategic complementarity compared to strategic substitution. In
our data, however, this is not due to differences in levels of reciprocity as suggested previously.
Instead, we find that slow learning and noisy choices might drive this effect. When subjects
are allowed to communicate in free-form online chat before making choices, cooperation levels
increase significantly to the extent that the difference in the two strategic environments dis-
appears. A machine-assisted natural language processing approach shows how the content of
communication differs in the two strategic environments.
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1 Introduction
In many economic decisions, there is a tension between what is individually rational and what
is collectively optimal. Whether or not this dilemma can be resolved in favor of cooperation on
the collectively optimal outcomes may depend on a multitude of aspects in the specific context,
as shown in the extant experimental literature. This paper sheds light on two of the determi-
nants of cooperative behavior in games with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. Particularly, we
investigate the impacts of the strategic environment, i.e., whether strategic interactions exhibit
complementarity or substitution, and communication on the levels of cooperation.
Theoretically, as long as interactions are to be repeated certain commonly known times, cooper-
ation unravels in equilibrium due to backward induction.1 However, ample experimental evidence
demonstrates that participants reach and sustain cooperation to a significant extent.2 In market
games, for instance, this extent might depend on the type of the goods, as in Holt (1993), who notes
that sellers of substitute goods might find it easier to collude tacitly than do sellers of complement
goods.3 Similar findings related to price and quantity competition point to the argument that reac-
tion functions are upward sloping in Bertrand games, while they are downward sloping in Cournot
games.4 The former is a case of strategic complementarity and the latter is a case of strategic
substitution. Here, we build on this finding and further the inquiry into how cooperation is reached
and sustained in repeated dilemma games with neutral (non-market) framing when communication
is available.
In our benchmark setting without communication, we follow Potters and Suetens (2009) (PS),
who approach the question by singling out the effect of the strategic environment by controlling
for potential confounds such as externalities and equilibrium as well as cooperation strategies and
payoffs. Our findings regarding this benchmark setup confirm previous results that suggest a higher
tendency towards cooperation under strategic complementarity as opposed to strategic substitu-
tion. We find that under complementarity, choices are higher than equilibrium levels (i.e., more
cooperative), which are, in turn, higher than choices under substitution. On the other hand, we find
that reciprocity, as suggested before, does not explain this effect: changes in partner’s choices are
followed to the same extent under both strategic environments. We show, however, through simu-
lations based on a simple reinforcement learning model with random initialization, that this can be
driven by slow learning coupled with noisy choices. Thus, we conclude that the differences between
the strategic environments can be merely due to best-reply mechanics, rather than a behavioral
impact.5
We implemented an extension to the baseline setup by allowing subjects to chat before making
1See Mermer et al. (2016) for an analysis on indefinitely repeated games.
2See, inter alia, Embrey et al. (2017) and Mengel (2017) for meta-studies on how cooperation is reached and
sustained in repeated social dilemma games. Crawford (2019) provides a recent review on determinants of cooperation,
including the role of communication.
3The intuition is that in case of substitutes the Bertrand price competition model generates upward sloping reaction
functions in prices and hence theory predicts that if one seller moves away from Nash equilibrium toward the collusive
outcome, the other seller has a unilateral incentive to respond by raising price toward the collusive outcome.
4See Suetens and Potters (2007) for a discussion and review of results on this issue and Potters and Suetens (2013)
for a survey on oligopoly experiments.
5This is supported by our model-fitting exercise with Poisson cognitive hierarchy model a` la Camerer et al. (2004).
The estimated values of τ parameters coincide for both strategic environments, both in our data and PS’. Details can
be provided upon request.
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decisions in each period, to determine whether the difference in the degree of cooperation between
the two strategic environments continues to hold with free-form non-binding costless pre-play com-
munication and also to better understand how the strategic environment affects how subjects reason
about the game. Previous literature does not provide a clear answer to this question. Although
communication is found, in general, to enhance cooperation, its effect on the levels of cooperation
(or coordination) is not definite, as it is known to depend on the type, duration, or contents of
communication, as well as the specifics of the game.6
Fonseca and Normann (2014) investigate the impact of communication in Bertrand markets
with different sizes, and find that, free-from communication helps to obtain higher profits and firms
continue collusion successfully after communication is disabled. They note, however, referring to
Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Whinston (2008), that the effect of communication on dilemma
games is subject to debate. Waichman et al. (2014) note that there is only very little attention
devoted to the study of the impact of communication on Cournot markets and find that free-form
communication boosts collusion levels (measured by both aggregate output and collusion counts),
while standardized communication does not have a significant effect.7
We find that when subjects can communicate, average choices and payoffs shift substantially
and about 75 percent of pairs reach and sustain efficient cooperation in both strategic environments.
Thus, communication has an “ironing effect”: the impact of the strategic environment on aggregate
cooperation disappears. Considering the hardship of eliminating communication in order to avoid
collusion in oligopolies, or the prevalence of communication, for instance, in the cases of R&D
competition, public good provision, and team production, our finding points to that the strategic
environment may not be of significance. Nonetheless, there are some differences to note. Firstly,
communication is more effective in helping participants to cooperate, even if not at the efficient level,
in substitution than in complementarity. Also, among those pairs who reach efficient cooperation,
reaching it is more gradual under complementarity.
To better understand the way communication works in the two strategic environments, we em-
ploy a machine-assisted natural language processing (NLP) approach to analyze chat records. NLP
methods are increasingly employed in economic research (see Gentzkow et al., 2019).8 However,
these tools were not previously considered in analyses of communication records in experimental
games.9
6Andersson and Wengstro¨m (2012) find that the possibility of repeated communication does not necessarily lead
to more cooperation, for instance, in two-stage games.
7Gomez-Martinez et al. (2016) study the effect of the revelation of firm-specific data in a Cournot game with
multiple firms, and find that communication helps to reach collusive agreements in both individual and aggregate
information treatments. Awaya and Krishna (2016) investigate, in their theoretical study that is built on a model of
repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts, how unverifiable communication about past sales can facilitate collusion.
Bigoni et al. (2018) run a series of experiments with an indefinitely repeated noisy Cournot game to investigate the
effect of flexibility (ability to respond quickly) on cooperation, and observe rapid convergence to very low levels of
cooperation, independent of flexibility.
8Recent works include, among others, Hansen and McMahon (2016), who assess the impact of content in central
bank communication on real economic variables, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), who investigate the demand for
like-minded news as a reason behind bias in newspapers, Mueller and Rauh (2018), who suggest implementing topic
models in the analysis of newspaper articles to predict timing of political violence, and Grajzl and Murrell (2019),
who employ a structural topic model to study features of Francis Bacon’s writings in relation to their importance
regarding the history of economic thought.
9See Brandts et al. (2019) for a survey. Penczynski (2018) is the only work we are aware of that proposes a machine
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We refer to an unsupervised learning method for content analysis of the chat records. In
particular, we estimate a structural topic model (Roberts et al., 2016) that presumes that subjects’
chats are formed as a weighted mixture of topics that are in turn distributions over words. We
find that the topical content of subjects’ chat records depend on the two strategic environment and
whether or not they achieve efficient cooperation in the game. Specifically, we find evidence in chat
content for that although it is equally likely for subjects to realize and swiftly move to efficient
cooperation in the two strategic environments, in case this does not happen early on, subjects in
complementarity reach efficient cooperation by agreeing on gradual moves towards it, whereas in
substitution either they do not reach it or they may jump to it later on.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the experimental
design and procedure. Section 3 delivers our major findings on the strategic environment effect and
its interaction with the effect of communication. Section 4 contains chat analysis, while Section 5
concludes.
2 The Experiment
2.1 Design
We designed treatments with strategies as substitutes and complements, both with and without
communication. Hence, we had a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. Subjects played the stage game
repeatedly for 30 times in fixed pairs (partner matching). The dominance-solvable stage game has a
unique Nash equilibrium that is Pareto dominated. Also there is a unique socially efficient outcome,
the joint profit maximization (JPM) outcome, which is symmetric. In both strategic environments,
there is positive externality, i.e., one’s own payoff is increasing in partner’s actions.10
Let x1, x2 ≥ 0 denote the actions for players 1 and 2 in a pair, respectively. We write the
quadratic payoff functions for each treatment as
piCompi (xi, xj) = c1 + c2xi + c3xj − c4x2i + c5x2j + c6xixj ,
piSubsi (xi, xj) = c
′
1 + c
′
2xi + c
′
3xj − c′4x2i + c′5x2j − c′6xixj ,
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. The coefficients satisfy (i) c′1 = c1, (ii) c′2 = c2(2c4−c6)2c4+c6 , (iii) c′3 =
c3+
2c2c6
2c4+c6
, (iv) c′4 =
c4(2c4−c6)2
(2c4+c6)2
, (v) c′5 = c5+
2c36
(2c4+c6)2
, and (vi) c′6 =
c6(2c4−c6)2
(2c4+c6)2
. These six conditions
guarantee that the NE choices and payoffs, the JPM choices and payoffs, the optimal defection
payoff, and the absolute value of the slope of the reaction curve are the same across strategic
environments. The latter makes the best-reply dynamics generate the same speed of convergence.
Figure 1 summarizes the similarities and the differences between strategic environments.
We follow PS and set c1 = −28, c2 = 5.474, c3 = 0.01, c4 = 0.278, c5 = 0.0055, c6 = 0.165, and
x ∈ [0, 28]. Given these values, we have xNE = 14, xJPM = 25.5, piNE = 27.71, piJPM = 41.94, and
the optimal defection payoff pidefect = 60.14. The slope of the reaction curve under complementarity
is 0.3, while it is −0.3 under substitution.
learning approach.
10PS find that the sign of externality does not play a significant role on the degree of cooperation.
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Figure 1. Best response functions and NE and JPM choices.
without Communication with Communication
Complementarity 56 (4) 100 (8)
Substitution 64 (6) 74 (5)
Table 1. Number of participants (sessions) in four treatments.
2.2 Procedure
All our computerized sessions were conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of
Nice.11 In total, 308 student subjects participated in the experiment. Numbers of subjects (sessions)
per treatment are provided in Table 1.12
Instructions with screenshots were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of each session
(see Appendix A). The instructions were exactly the same for complementarity and substitution
and subjects were told that their earnings were going to be based on their own decisions and the
decision of another participant, with whom they were matched for the session. No reference to
any market or economic term was made; the experiment was introduced as a neutral decision-
making problem with two persons involved. Each participant received a payoff table showing own
payoff corresponding to choices in even numbers between 0 and 28 (see Appendix B). In addition
to the payoff table, subjects were provided on their screen a payoff calculator for hypothetical
numbers that they wanted to try out. The number of decimal points for both the calculator and
decisions was restricted to be one. In sessions with communication, subjects could communicate
voluntarily through a chat box during one minute before moving to the decision stage. Offensive
language and identifying messages were banned but there was no further restriction on the content
of communication.
The stage game was repeated for 30 periods, starting after a trial period with forced decisions.13
History of past decisions and payoffs was provided at each period. Payoffs were denoted in points
11We used the experimental software toolkit z-Tree to program the experiment (see Fischbacher, 2007).
12The number of participants and sessions varied across treatments due to variation in show-up rate across sessions.
We base our analysis on 294 subjects excluding 7 pairs, in which at least one subject make choices less than or equal
to 2 for half of the experiment or longer. We believe these subjects are taken by the instructions in the trial period,
in which we requested them to play 2.
13In the trial period, the payoff calculators were used twice to calculate hypothetical payoffs. In chat treatments,
the chat box is tried out by typing “hello” (bonjour) after this and finally, a forced decision has been commanded.
Payoffs in the trial period did not count in final earnings.
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Figure 2. Average degree of cooperation.
and exchanged for cash at a rate of 100 points = 1 Euro. The final earnings paid at the end
of the experiment consisted of a participation fee of 5 Euros and total payoffs throughout the
session. Subjects earned on average 15.5 Euros in treatments with communication and 11.3 Euros
in treatments without communication, including 5 Euros show-up fee. The average duration of
a session without communication was 90 minutes, whereas it was 105 minutes for sessions with
communication.
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Aggregate Results
The subsequent analysis is based on the degree of cooperation, which is defined, for a pair k in
period t with average choice within pair denoted by x¯kt, as follows:
ρkt =
x¯kt − xNE
xJPM − xNE . (1)
The average degrees of cooperation in four treatments are reported in Figure 2 and Table 2.
As is clearly seen in Figure 2, when communication is not allowed, complementarity induces more
cooperation compared to substitution. This is in line with previous findings, particularly with PS.14
14Although overall comparison in between treatments is the same with PS, several observations should be noted.
First, in PS, the average cooperation rates are higher (0.27 in substitution and 0.41 in complementarity). In both
of their treatments, there seems to be a clear increasing trend of choices over the periods after first few. In case of
complementarity, average choices increase as high as to the level of the JPM. Second, choices in PS are both higher
than Nash equilibrium, whereas, in our data, substitution treatment has lower average choices than the NE. And
finally, the end game effect in PS is stronger compared to our data for both treatments. These observations might
be explained by differences in subject pools across studies.
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No Communication Communication
Periods Substitution Complementarity p−value Substitution Complementarity p−value
1-30 -0.07 (0.28) 0.16 (0.29) 0.034 0.72 (0.34) 0.74 (0.33) 0.538
1-15 -0.09 (0.24) 0.19 (0.31) 0.000 0.63 (0.43) 0.67 (0.37) 0.538
16-30 -0.06 (0.38) 0.13 (0.33) 0.018 0.82 (0.32) 0.81 (0.37) 0.240
1 0.03 (0.85) -0.05 (0.72) 0.695 0.43 (0.90) 0.37 (0.70) 0.950
30 -0.22 (0.57) 0.00 (0.36) 0.046 0.57 (0.51) 0.70 (0.43) 0.104
Table 2. Average degrees of cooperation (standard deviations in parentheses). Standard
deviations measure between-pair variability, except for first period, in which individual choices
are used. Reported p−values are for alternative hypotheses in the WMW tests for higher degrees
of cooperation under complementarity.
Next, for both strategic environments, communication boosts the levels of cooperation. However,
this shift leads to the disappearance of the strategic environment effect, i.e., when communication
is allowed, the degree of cooperation is the same across strategic environments.15
Table 2 delivers details and test results for all periods combined (1-30), first half of the exper-
iment (1-15), second half of the experiment (16-30), first period, and last period. The p−values
correspond to Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests of the null hypotheses that the degree of
cooperation is the same in substitution and complementarity. When communication is not allowed,
all the null hypotheses (except for the first period) are rejected in favor of the alternative hypotheses
that the degree of cooperation is higher in complementarity than in substitution. However, when
communication is allowed, we reject none of the null hypotheses. It is immediate to observe that
the average degrees of cooperation are substantially higher when communication is allowed within
a strategic environment.16
3.1.1 End-game effect
The end-game effect that is generally observed in finitely repeated social dilemma games (Selten
and Stoecker, 1986) seems to take place in all our treatments, as seen in Figure 2. Let us define this
effect as |ρ30 − ρ16−30| where ρ16−30 is the average degree of cooperation in the second half of the
experiment and ρ30 is the average degree of cooperation in the final period. We observe that the
end-game effect is slightly stronger (0.16) under substitution compared to complementarity (0.13).
This might partially be explained by the fact that optimal defection choice under substitution (10.6)
is much lower than in complementarity (17.4), as noted by PS.
3.1.2 Reciprocity
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the model
∆xit = β0 + β1∆xjt−1 + β2COMPi∆xjt−1 + β3COMPi + uit,
15Figure 13 in Appendix C shows the comparison of payoffs.
16All tests yield a p−value of 0. We tested if this is due to the extra time given for chat, rather than the effect
of communication itself by running two extra sessions with the same extra time (1 minute) but without the ability
to communicate. The results can be found in Appendix C.2, which show that the extra time in communication
treatments have only a small effect.
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β1 β2
Estimate p−value Estimate p−value
0.16 0.012 −0.04 0.554
Table 3. Regression results (with individual random effects) on changes in choices without
communication. Standard errors are robust to within-pair dependency. Two-tailed p−values
are reported.
where COMP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for choices in complementarity treatment
and the value 0 for substitution, ∆xit is the change in the choice of subject i from period t− 1 to
t, and ∆xjt−1 is the change in the choice of the partner from period t − 2 to t − 1. We observe
significant reciprocity among our subjects, represented by the β1 estimate in Table 3. However,
there is no difference between strategic environments (βˆ2 is not significantly different from zero).
This is in contrast to what PS find. Specifically, PS observe that subjects in complementarity have
significantly higher reciprocity (βˆ2 = 0.17 with p = 0.003).
As differences in the degree of reciprocity between two strategic environments do not explain the
higher degree of cooperation under complementarity in our data, in the next section we investigate
whether a learning model can generate the result of our experiment.
3.2 Learning
We consider a simple reinforcement learning model where learning is based on realized payoffs (see
Erev and Roth, 1998). Let xti denote the action agent i chooses in period t, s the step size used
to discretize the action space, and S the discretized action space. Furthermore, Aiq(t) denotes the
attraction associated with action x for agent i at period t. Given the attractions, the probability
that i chooses x in period t is defined by
pix(t) =
eλA
i
x(t)∑
k∈S e
λAik(t)
,
where λ ≥ 0 is the parameter that governs the “sensitivity” of choice to the attraction. λ = 0 means
uniformly random choice (thus, attractions play no role) and λ→∞ means that the quantity with
the highest attraction for agent i in period t will be chosen with probability 1.
We assume that each action has the same level of initial attraction, which is equal to the average
payoff i can obtain if both i and j uniformly randomize their actions, i.e.,
Aix(0) =
∑
(a,b)∈S×S
pii(a, b)/|S|2,
for all x ∈ S. Furthermore, as in McAllister (1991) and Hanaki et al. (2005, 2018), we assume that
the attraction for any x ∈ S evolves as a weighted average with
Aix(t+ 1) =
{
ωAix(t) + (1− ω)pii(xti, xtj) if xti = x,
Aix(t) otherwise,
for all t ≥ 0, where ω is the “recency” parameter that indicates the speed at which past payoffs are
forgotten: ω = 0 when only the last period payoff is remembered and ω = 1 implies that only the
initial attractions are remembered. Thus, ω is higher when learning is slower.
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Figure 3. Simulated average degree of cooperation. Dashed (blue) lines are for complemen-
tarity.
3.2.1 Simulation results
We have simulated the model by varying λ and ω, while keeping s = 1. Figure 3 shows the dynamics
of the average degree of cooperation in our simulations. For each parameter value, we have created
100 pairs according to the model specified above. Degree of cooperation, ρ, is computed for each
simulated pair for each period, and the average is taken across these 100 simulated pairs.
When the choices are quite noisy, e.g., λ = 0.1 as in Figures 3a and 3b, we do observe a slightly
higher degree of cooperation in complementarity than in substitution. This is particularly so when
ω = 0.4. When choices are less noisy, e.g., λ ∈ {0.5, 0.9} as in Figures 3c to 3f, the differences in
the degree of cooperation depend on particular values of the parameters. In particular, if ω = 0.4
or λ = 0.9, the average degree of cooperation becomes higher in substitution in in complementarity
in later periods.
To investigate this more systematically, we have computed simulations for λ ∈ [0.1, 1.5] with
increments of 0.2, and ω ∈ [0.05, 0.95] with increments of 0.05. For each set of parameter values, as
before, we have created 100 simulated pairs. We then computed, for each simulated pair, the average
degree of cooperation within 30 periods. Namely, for pair k, the average degree of cooperation is
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defined as
ρk =
1
30
30∑
t=1
ρkt.
We then took the average of ρk across all simulated pairs and obtain ρ
C for complementarity and
ρS for substitution. Finally, we computed ∆ρ = ρC − ρS which summarizes the difference between
complementarity and substitution, namely, the size of the strategic environment effect.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between ∆ρ and ω for four values of λ. The average degree
of cooperation in complementarity is higher than in substitution when learning is slow enough
(ω ≥ 0.8). When choices are less sensitive to attractions (λ is smaller), we observe the strategic
environment effect for faster learning (smaller ω) as well. These results suggest that the strategic
environment effect we observed in our experiments can be explained by slow learning and noisy
choices of participants.
3.3 Full-cooperation behavior
We say the choice of a subject at any period is at JPM level if it lies in the interval [25, 26], and
we say the choices of a pair are at JPM level if both subjects play at JPM level simultaneously.
3.3.1 Without communication
When communication is not allowed, the number of pairs who have played JPM level as a pair at
least once is 4 in both environments, which amounts to 12.5% of the pairs in substitution and 14%
in complementarity.17 However, out of these four pairs, none of them sustained JPM level choices
for more than 5 periods in substitution, whereas in complementarity, three of them managed to
17Figures 15 and 16 in the Appendix D show the evolution of choices within pairs.
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No Communication Communication
Substitution Complementarity Substitution Complementarity
JPM at least once individually 30 (47%) 19 (34%) 67 (90%) 94 (94%)
JPM at least once as pair 4 (12%) 4 (14%) 33 (90%) 44 (88%)
JPM pairs − 3 (11%) 27 (73%) 40 (80%)
Table 4. Number (percentage) of pairs and subjects that play at JPM level at least once and
JPM pairs.
cooperate fully from the first period they play at JPM level as a pair until the penultimate period.18
We call a pair a JPM pair if their choices as a pair are at the JPM level for at least three periods
until the last period, the last but one period, the last but two periods, or the last but three periods.19
The rest of the pairs are called non-JPM.
We see in Table 4 that more subjects make JPM level choices in substitution (47% and 34%).
One might conclude that subjects tend to unilaterally try out JPM strategies more in substitution,
whereas only under complementarity we have pairs that succeed in sustaining cooperation for several
periods.20 It should be noted, however, that this difference is not statistically significant (Fisher’s
test yields a p−value of 0.193).
3.3.2 With communication
Table 4 shows also the number (percentage) of subjects and pairs who make JPM level choices at
least once in both strategic environment with communication, together with JPM pairs. We do
not observe any significant difference between strategic environments (Fisher’s tests yield p−values
greater than 0.4).21
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the degree of cooperation for both JPM and non-JPM pairs in
both strategic environments. The JPM pairs start at already high degrees of cooperation and grad-
ually reach full cooperation in average. The average choice of non-JPM pairs in complementarity
treatment is stable throughout the experiment, whereas there is a visible trend in substitution. In
fact, the average degree of cooperation over all periods under substitution is much higher for non-
18The first periods of mutual full-cooperation for these three pairs are: 4, 6, and 18. One other pair in complemen-
tarity plays at JPM level only once, at the 28th period. In substitution, two pairs play at JPM level only once (24th
and 30th periods), one pair at 22nd and 24th periods, and another pair between 15th and 19th periods.
19The following results do not depend on the choice of the length of mutual cooperation. Details can be provided
upon request.
20Mengel (2017), in her survey comprising 96 studies with 3500 subjects in total, finds that risk (loss from unilateral
cooperation) and temptation (gain from unilateral defection) play a significant role on the levels of cooperation in
prisoners’ dilemma games. If we look at the restricted game with only NE and JPM strategies for respectively defection
and cooperation, the value of the risk parameter is calculated to be approximately 2.6 for our complementarity
treatment and 0.8 for our substitution treatment. Similarly, the value of the temptation parameter is calculated to
be approximately 1.06 for our complementarity treatment and 1.22 for our substitution treatment. Mengel (2017)
concludes that in repeated games with partner matching, temptation explains better the variation in cooperative
behavior. As temptation is higher, sustaining cooperation is more difficult in substitution. On the other hand, as
risk is higher in complementarity, fewer subjects tend to try out (jump to) JPM strategies. The latter follows from
the argument that risk is crucial in determining short-run incentives (see Blonski et al., 2011). Similar conclusions
can be drawn from the analysis based on “size of the basin of attraction” a` la Embrey et al. (2017).
21Figures 17 and 18 in the Appendix E show the evolution of choices within pairs.
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Figure 5. Average degree of cooperation by JPM and non-JPM pairs.
JPM pairs when communication is allowed (0.28) compared to when communication is not allowed
(-0.07). This difference is not as large for complementarity (0.25 for non-JPM with communication
and 0.16 for without communication). We conclude that communication fosters cooperation in
substitution to a greater extent, even if it does not lead to full cooperation.
Finally, there is no visible end-game effect in either of strategic environments, which indicates
that subjects in non-JPM pairs are not involved in the game strategically to the extent those in
JPM pairs are, who show a substantial end-game effect.
4 Communication
Many experimental studies include communication, and it is often implemented in free-form, in
which subjects are not restricted in the content of their messages, except for abusive words and
identification purposes, as was the case in our experiments. It has been documented that free-
form communication, as opposed to structured or restricted communication, has a larger impact
on strategic interactions.22 On the other hand, there is a big challenge facing the analyses of the
22Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2011) emphasize the effectivity of free-form communication in enhancing effi-
ciency when equilibria can be Pareto ranked. Cooper and Ku¨hn (2014) conclude that allowing a rich message space
leads to persistent collusion in a two-person two-period matrix game resembling Bertrand price competition. Brandts
et al. (2015) argue that restricted and unilateral communication is less effective compared to free-form communication
in contract games. Andersson and Wengstro¨m (2012) argue that free-form communication increases the importance of
social preferences as opposed to structured communication. Building on this argument, Cason and Mui (2015) deliver
evidence for that rich communication is more effective in facilitating coordinated resistance modeled a` la Weingast
(1995). Cason et al. (2012), on the other hand, point to contest environments where free-form communication might
damage efficiency. Finally, Wang and Houser (2019) find that in coordination games, free-form communication boosts
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Periods Substitution Complementarity p−value
1-30 1.97 (2.00) 1.57 (1.81) 0.000
1-15 2.05 (1.87) 1.85 (1.77) 0.000
16-30 1.88 (2.12) 1.30 (1.82) 0.000
Table 5. Average number of messages per period (s.d. in parentheses). The p−values are due
to two-tailed WMW tests.
impact of free-form communication on strategic behavior that pertains to the question of how it
works.
Free-form communication is more and more prevalent in economic experiments that are imple-
mented online and in laboratory, and has a distinctive power to reveal reasoning and deliberative
processes in strategic decision-making. Naturally, however, assessment of this kind of data can
be complex and are, most of the time, based on subjective judgment of researchers or research
assistants. Current practices with regard to making sense of chat data coming from free-form
communication in lab experiments include (i) self-classification of messages in order to relate the
choice of words or messages to actual plays and outcomes (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006;
Schotter and Sopher, 2007; Kimbrough et al., 2008), (ii) content analysis in which a few research
assistants are recruited to be trained to code messages into categories formed by the researchers
(see Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2008), and (iii)
classification coordination game a` la Houser and Xiao (2011), in which coders are incentivized to
pay more attention through rewarding the codes that match the most popular evaluation among
other coders’ evaluations (see Corazzini et al., 2014; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Andersson
et al., 2010).
In this paper, we propose the use of computerized techniques in analyzing experimental chat
data in place of human labor. Advantages are that (i) they are less costly in terms of time and
money as researchers devote less time to the analysis and do not have to hire coders or assistants, (ii)
they may make language restriction redundant as many techniques in natural language processing
are language-free (as in unsupervised learning methods), and (iii) they may rely on subjective
assessments to a lesser extent.
Before proceeding to the implementation of the particular method we use, i.e., the structural
topic model (STM), we look at the general features of our chat data, in relation to the strategic
environment and full-cooperation behavior.
4.1 Number of messages sent
In this section we look at the number of messages sent by subjects.23 All 174 subjects sent at least
one message throughout the experiment. They sent, on average, 1.74 messages per period. In the
first half of the experiment, the average is 1.93, which is significantly higher than the second half
(1.55, with p = 0.000 in a WMW two-tailed test). As can be seen in Table 5, in complementarity
average number of messages per period is 1.57, whereas it is 1.97 in substitution. Thus, we conclude
coordination much more than restricted communication.
23This is based on the number of times subjects clicked the “send” button.
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Figure 6. Average number of messages and percentage of subjects who do not send any
message per period. The period 0 stands for the forced trial period.
that subjects sent more messages in substitution treatments, the difference being about one message
in every two periods.
Figure 6a depicts the evolution of the number of messages over time by strategic environment,
which confirms that, especially in the second half of the experiment, subjects in the substitution
treatment sent more messages. The percentage of subjects who do not send any message is in-
creasing in complementarity treatment, whereas there is no visible trend in substitution, as seen in
Figure 6b. This might be explained in part with the fact that there are more pairs who manage to
reach and sustain full-cooperation and may not need further communication in complementarity
(see Table 4). In what follows, we look more closely at the messaging patterns in JPM and non-JPM
pairs.
4.1.1 Full-cooperation and communication
Considering two strategic environments together, subjects both in JPM and non-JPM pairs send
on average 1.74 messages (s.d. = 1.90 and 1.91 respectively) per period. In the first half of the
experiment, average messages are 1.96 (s.d. = 1.80) and 1.86 (s.d. = 1.85), respectively. The
number of messages sent by non-JPM subjects are significantly higher than the JPM subjects only
in the second half of the experiment (1.62 (s.d. = 1.96) and 1.53 (s.d. = 1.98), respectively, with
p = 0.014 from WMW two-tailed test). Table 6 shows these values for each strategic environment
separately, together with p−values for corresponding tests.
Substitution Complementarity
Periods non-JPM pairs JPM pairs p−value non-JPM pairs JPM pairs p−value
1-30 2.12 (2.02) 1.91 (1.99) 0.000 1.36 (1.71) 1.63 (1.83) 0.000
1-15 2.07 (1.90) 2.05 (1.86) 0.897 1.66 (1.78) 1.89 (1.76) 0.009
16-30 2.18 (2.14) 1.76 (2.11) 0.000 1.05 (1.58) 1.36 (1.87) 0.010
Table 6. Average number of messages per period (standard deviations in parentheses). Re-
ported p−values are for two-tailed WMW tests.
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Figure 7. 298 stemmed terms that are used by subjects at least 10 times in total. Centrality,
size, and colors reflect frequencies.
Subjects sent more messages in substitution treatments regardless of if they manage to reach
and sustain full cooperation or not. In complementarity, JPM subjects send more messages both in
the first and second half of the experiment. In substitution, on the other hand, non-JPM subjects
send more messages in the second half of the experiment and there is no difference in the first half.
The fact that non-JPM subjects send fewer messages in complementarity compared to JPM
might indicate that the failure of cooperation in complementarity is due to failure in communi-
cation. On the other hand, non-JPM subjects send more messages in the substitution treatment,
which might indicate that even when subjects communicate (e.g., to find a common ground), com-
munication may not lead to cooperation, which is harder.
In what follows, we explore chat content for a better understanding of how strategic environment
effects cooperative behavior.
4.2 Message Content
We first look at frequencies of terms subjects used in their communication. The word cloud in
Figure 7 shows the terms that appeared in chats at least ten times.24 We build our analysis on
chat records for each of 86 pairs.25
We first compare the most frequently used terms across treatments. To do so, we refer to the
relative rank differences (r.r.d., a` la Huerta, 2008) of 50 most frequent terms. For each term t, we
24The proceeding analysis is executed with the R packages quanteda (Benoit et al., 2017) and tm (Feinerer, 2018).
The stopwords we removed that may not be predefined in these packages are listed in the Appendix G.1. Details
of our preparation for the content analysis, which includes a mild orthographical clean-up necessitated by common
mistakes, can be provided upon request.
25We exclude a pair in substitution treatment who did not communicate beyond first period. Some stopwords are
removed after the word cloud in Figure 7. This removal emptied one other subject’s chat content, thus we have 171
subjects, whose chat records are utilized.
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shaded region we have −1/2 ≤ ∆rCS (t) ≤ 1 and only outside this region we have either of
the difference greater than 1. The term “10” in substitution is matched with the term “18” in
complementarity as they are the corresponding optimal defection choices.
compute r.r.d. for substitution as
∆rCS (t) =
rC(t)− rS(t)
rS(t)
,
where rC(t) stands for the rank of the word t in the decreasing order of the times it is used by the
subjects in the complementarity treatment, and rS(t) stands for the substitution treatment. The
relative rank difference for complementarity, ∆rSC(t), is symmetrically defined. We pay a particular
attention to those words that have either ∆rCS (t) > 1 or ∆r
S
C(t) > 1, following Fischer and Normann
(2019).
Figure 8 shows the ranks of the top 50 words in both treatments.26 The shaded (green) area
indicates r.r.d. values smaller than or equal to 1.27 The rankings of words are remarkably similar
across treatments. This points to that communication is utilized in similar ways in aggregate in
both strategic environments. Nevertheless, there are some observations we can make. For instance,
there are two terms that appear to be significantly more frequently used by subjects in substitution
treatment. The term “mainten” refers only to the word “maintenant”, i.e., “now” in English. A
closer look into chat content and choices in the game reveals that this difference is due to the
excessive usage of the word by subjects in a small set of pairs who try to sustain a sophisticated
alternating strategy.28
26Three terms are not included as they did not appear more than 10 times in substitution although they were in
the top 50 for complementarity. These are “period” (period), “tableau” (table), and “chiffr” (number), which are at
41st, 44th, and 45th ranks in complementarity, respectively.
27Note that ∆rCS (t) = −∆rSC(t)/(∆rSC(t) + 1).
28 Figure 19 in the Appendix F shows that this term is not outside the shaded region for JPM pairs. Figure 20
shows the same data for non-JPM pairs.
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This alternating strategy involves playing the action pair (28, 10) in one round, and (10, 28) in
the following. Thus, subjects remind each other quite frequently that “now” it is their turn to play,
for instance, the action “10”. And it is immediate to observe that this strategy is embraced by some
pairs as the action pair (28, 10) maximizes the payoff for the first player (although the two-period
average payoff, 36.54, is lower than JPM, 41.94). The corresponding pair in complementarity is
(28, 18), which pays the same to first player. However, this strategy is observed only in substitution
treatments as the reverse pays negative and much lower in complementarity (-7.56 vs. 4.87 in
substitution). The pairs (with IDs 298, 1894, 2091, and 2097) that employ this alternating strategy
can be seen in the Figure 18 in Appendix E.
The difference in popularity of the term (word) “grave” indicates that under substitution, more
subjects need to reassure and forgive the other one for maintaining full cooperation, as defections, or
mistakes, happen more.29 Furthermore, the terms that appear at higher ranks in complementarity,
i.e., “22” and “25”, together with “20” and “24”, which also have relatively high r.r.d values although
smaller than 1, point to that in complementarity the move towards full cooperation is more gradual,
as discussions about interim cooperative choices are more prevalent. That “25.5”, the exact value of
JPM choice that is not in the payoff tables, is slightly more popular among subjects in substitution
might indicate that the move is not as gradual but happens due to jumps to full cooperation.
4.3 Structural topic modeling
The use of machine-assisted natural language processing techniques has not been considered pre-
viously in analyses of communication data coming from (lab) experiments (see the beginning of
Section 4 for a review of current practices). Penczynski (2018), in the only other related work we
are aware of, suggests that computer classification can be employed to validate the consistency of
standard content analyses and finds that a supervised learning approach can replicate to a consider-
able extent the human classification of written accounts of reasoning in terms of models of cognitive
processes in experimental games of beauty contest, hide and seek, social learning, and coordination.
Here, we propose topic modeling for the analysis of chat data coming from lab experiments.
Topic models form an unsupervised method to recover generative underlying topics in a col-
lection of documents (corpora) to exploit the co-occurrence of words towards a classification of
documents. Structural topic models, which are logistic-normal mixed membership topic models,
built on the early works in topic modeling such as the Latent Dirichlet Analysis (Blei et al., 2003)
and the Correlated Topic Model (Blei and Lafferty, 2007), among others, allow researchers to in-
tegrate metadata (document-level covariates other than text) into the latent semantic analysis of
documents (see Roberts et al., 2014).
Particularly, in an STM, a set of covariates are chosen to explain topical variation across docu-
ments, and even variation in the usage of different words within topics. Let there be D documents.
A document d ∈ {1, . . . , D} is seen as beginning with a collection of Nd empty positions, each to
be filled with a word. Assume there are K topics that exist in the whole corpora. Then, to fill
a position, a topic k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} will be chosen according to a distribution over topics firstly.
29The term appears as in “ce n’est pas grave”, which translates as “it does not matter” in English, in the chat
content of 7 (3) subjects in 5 (3) pairs in substitution (complementarity). They use this term as in this sentence to
show forgiveness for a cheating attempt or a (self-declared) mistake by the opponent. Details can be provided upon
request.
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Figure 9. Word clouds for each topic.
The chosen topic is also a probability distribution, this time over words in the vocabulary (of the
corpora), and it is according to this the choice of the particular word for each empty position is
made. The metadata used in an STM estimation comes into play in recovering the probability
distributions both over topics (topic prevalence) and words (topical content). Topical prevalence
refers to how much of a document is associated with a topic. Topical content, on the other hand,
refers to the words used in topics.30
We estimated a model with three topics, while topic prevalence is assumed to be dependent on
the strategic environment and full cooperation behavior, without a topical content covariate. The
basis of analysis is the chat content for each pair throughout the experiment. A detailed account
of our procedures regarding model selection can be found in the Appendix G.
4.3.1 Topical content
Figure 9 shows the word clouds for each topic separately. In the first topic, most used term is “26”,
the JPM choice on the payoff table. In the second topic, it is the verb ”met” (“put” in English),
and in the third topic, it is “mdr” (acronym for “mort de rire”, corresponding to “lol” or “laughing
out loud” in English, although literally “dead from laughing”).
Figure 10 shows the results from a regression estimation where chat content in pairs are the
units, the outcome is the proportion of each document about a topic in an STM model, and the
explanatory dummy variables indicate strategic environment and whether the pair is a JPM pair
or not.31 This estimation shows that in complementarity, Topic 1 is used relatively more and Topic
2 and 3 are used in substitution. On the other hand, while non-JPM subjects use Topic 2 more,
JPM subjects use Topic 3 more. In what follows we look at these patterns more closely.
For the following analyses we divide JPM pairs into early and eventual JPM pairs. We say
that a JPM pair is an early JPM pair if both players in the pair choose 24 or higher more
than 6 times within the first 10 periods. A JPM pair that is not an early JPM pair is called
30We refer the reader to Roberts et al. (2016) for the formal aspects of the estimation procedure. In short, model
estimation uses a fast semi-collapsed, variational expectation maximization algorithm where Laplace approximations
are used for the non-conjugate portions of the model.
31See Roberts et al. (2019) for details. This procedure incorporates measurement uncertainty from the STM model
using the method of composition. Appendix G.3 contains the estimated topic proportions for each pair in both
treatments and Appendix G.4 delivers a set of examples of chat contents together with estimated topic proportions.
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Figure 10. Mean differences in topic proportions for strategic environment and JPM behavior
together with 95% confidence intervals.
an eventual JPM pair.32 The percentage of early JPM subjects are the same in both treatments
(Pr[early JPM|SUBS] = 0.44 and Pr[early JPM|COMP ] = 0.43). This indicates that jumping to
JPM is equally likely in both strategic environments. However, it appears that among the pairs
who do not reach and sustain full cooperation early on, eventual cooperation is less likely under
substitution (Pr[JPM|not early, SUBS] = 0.55 and Pr[JPM|not early, COMP ] = 0.68).
Table 7 shows the mean topic proportions. Note that Topic 1 is more popular among eventual
JPM pairs in complementarity. As interim choices (such as 20, 22, and 24) appear with relatively
higher frequencies in this topic, we conclude that these pairs reach full cooperation by agreeing on
gradual moves towards cooperation. On the other hand, we do not see any significant difference
between early and eventual JPM pairs in the substitution. Finally, Topic 3 is used more by JPM
pairs in both treatments. While the difference is significant in substitution, in complementarity, it is
not. However, this topic is significantly more frequently used by early JPM pairs than eventual JPM
pairs in complementarity. These differences point to a possibility that those pairs who managed to
reach and sustain full cooperation switch to a more collegial conversation, not necessarily related
to the game anymore, reflected by the large weight of the term “mdr”.
5 Conclusion
Social dilemmas are prevalent in economic decision-making processes and strategic environment is
argued to have a significant impact on how they are resolved.33 Our results confirm the previous
finding that in the absence of communication, aggregate behavior is more cooperative under com-
plementarity as opposed to substitution. Our results differ from that of PS, however, in that the
higher degree of cooperation under complementarity is not due to the higher degree of reciprocity.
Rather, it is potentially due to noisy choices and slow learning by our participants.
32Our subsequent observations are robust to small changes in the choice of this interval. Details can be provided
upon request.
33See Eaton (2004) for an overview of the prevalence of strategic environment effects in social dilemma situations
in economic studies. These include patent races, international trade policies, arms races, team productions, public
goods, and so on.
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Topics All Non-JPM JPM p− value Early Eventual p− value
1 Comp 0.46 0.32 0.49 0.199 0.39 0.60 0.012
Subs 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.424 0.19 0.28 0.283
p−value 0.001 0.948 0.000 0.009 0.001
2 Comp 0.23 0.48 0.17 0.034 0.14 0.20 0.278
Subs 0.33 0.51 0.27 0.081 0.24 0.31 0.412
p−value 0.078 0.855 0.049 0.134 0.173
3 Comp 0.31 0.20 0.34 0.241 0.47 0.20 0.001
Subs 0.42 0.16 0.51 0.002 0.57 0.41 0.154
p−value 0.106 0.739 0.020 0.271 0.032
# Comp 49 9 40 21 19
Subs 36 9 27 16 11
Table 7. Mean topic proportions. p−values are due to two-sided t−tests with null hypotheses
that topic proportions do not differ.
Our major findings relate to the impact of communication. Firstly, communication boosts co-
operation levels in both strategic environments. Secondly, communication has an ironing effect
regarding the impact of strategic environment, in that the degree of cooperation in two strategic
environments becomes the same with communication. Considering many instances in which elim-
inating communication completely may not be viable, our findings point to, for instance, that the
strategic environment would not matter in terms of collusion possibilities in oligopoly markets.34
However, there remain some differences. Communication is more effective in helping participants to
cooperate, even if not at the efficient level, in substitution than in complementarity. Also, reaching
efficient cooperation happens in a more gradual fashion under complementarity.
Finally, our results from the structural topic model estimation show that the use of machine
learning techniques can be promising for the content analysis of experimental chat data. Through
our estimations, we are able to categorize the topics subjects talk about in their chats according to
their cooperative behavior and the strategic environment they are in.
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A Instructions for treatments with chat
Authors’ note: The following were read aloud and distributed in the beginning of the sessions within
chat treatments, for both complementarity and substitution. Aside from these instructions, subjects
also received payoff tables.
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision-making and will be asked to make
a number of decisions. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount
of money. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants. You can ask your
questions after the instructions and before we start the experiment.
Your earnings depend on your own decisions and on the decisions of one other participant. The
identity of the other participant will not be revealed. The other participant remains the same
during the entire experiment and will be referred to as “the other” in what follows.
The experiment consists of 30 periods. In each period you have to choose a number between
0.0 and 28.0 (in increments of 0.1 points). The other also chooses a number between 0.0 and 28.0.
Your earnings in points depend on your choice and the other’s choice. The table you have received
gives information about your earnings for some combinations of your choice and the other’s choice.
The other gets the same table.
At each period there will be two stages. In the first stage you are allowed to communicate with
the other. In the second stage you will make a decision. In the first stage, your screen will look
like the picture below.
In this first stage, you can calculate your and the other’s earnings in more detail (for choices
that are not multiples of 2 for instance) by using the EARNINGS CALCULATOR on the left of
your screen. On the right, you can communicate with the other through a chat box, during 1
minute. You can type your message in the bar at the bottom right and hit “Return”. Only you and
25
the other will be able to see the messages you send and you are allowed to post as many messages
as you like. The same is true for the other. The messages you send should not identify yourself
(e.g., name, age, gender, location, etc.) in any case and you may not use offensive language. If you
want to finish chat before 1 minute, you can click “Finish Chat” button at the top right. If the
other also clicks this button, communication will end and you will move to next stage.
In the second stage, your screen will look like the picture below.
In this stage you will not communicate but you will make your decision. You will see the message
history at the top left of the screen. At the bottom left, you can use the Earnings Calculator, same
as before. At the top right you are asked to type in your choice and click “Enter”. In each period
you have about 1 minute to enter your decision. A history of your and the other’s past choices and
earnings is available at the bottom right of your screen.
At the end of each period you are informed about the other’s choice and your and the other’s
earnings in that period as in the picture below.
26
Your total earnings in points are the sum of your earnings in points over the 30 periods. Your
earnings in points will be converted into EUR according to the rate: 100 points = 1 EUR.
Now we move to the trial period. The result of the trial period will not be counted into your
earnings. Please follow our instructions in the trial period.
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Figure 11. Payoff table for the complementarity treatments. Horizontal axis shows the part-
ner’s choices.
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Figure 12. Payoff table for the substitution treatments. Horizontal axis shows the partner’s
choices.
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C Payoff evolution and extra sessions
C.1 Payoff evolution
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Figure 13. Average payoffs per period for complementarity and substitution treatments with
and without chat.
C.2 Communication or extra time?
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Figure 14. Average choices within each substitution treatment, including extra sessions with
extra time without communication.
Here, we provide comparisons with the extra sessions we have run to check if the observed
effect of communication is due to the extra time in the communication treatments. Figure 14
29
No Communication Extra Time Communication
Choices 13.13 (7.31) 14.13 (7.47) 22.34 (7.28)
Subjects 64 48 74
Table 8. Average choices within each substitution treatment, including extra sessions with ex-
tra time without communication. The WMW test for any pair yield a p−value of approximately
zero. Tests are run over all periods, thus, cover number of subjects × 30 observations.
shows the average choices for each of the substitution treatments, including extra sessions where
subjects were given the same amount of time as in the communication treatments but were not
able to communicate. As can be seen in the figure, choices are very close to the case without extra
time and much lower than the treatment with communication. Table 8 shows the average choices
(standard deviations) for each treatment.
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D Choices in treatments without communication
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Figure 15. The evolution of choices in pairs under complementarity without communication.
Pair IDs are printed on top of each plot next to if the pair is a JPM pair (1, if not 0), and if the
pair is an early JPM pair (1, if not 0). The definitions of early and eventual JPM pairs are given
in Section 4.3.1. The plots are confined to the strategy space, i.e., the interval [0, 28]. Nash
equilibrium is 14 and JPM is 25.5 for both strategic environments and the optimal defection
choice is 18 for complementarity.
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Figure 16. The evolution of choices in pairs under substitution without communication. Pair
IDs are printed on top of each plot next to if the pair is a JPM pair (1, if not 0), and if the pair
is an early JPM pair (1, if not 0). The definitions of early and eventual JPM pairs are given
in Section 4.3.1. The plots are confined to the strategy space, i.e., the interval [0, 28]. Nash
equilibrium is 14 and JPM is 25.5 for both strategic environments and the optimal defection
choice is 10 for substitution.
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E Choices in treatments with communication
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Figure 17. The evolution of choices in pairs under complementarity with communication. Pair
IDs are printed on top of each plot next to if the pair is a JPM pair (1, if not 0), and if the pair
is an early JPM pair (1, if not 0). The definitions of early and eventual JPM pairs are given
in Section 4.3.1. The plots are confined to the strategy space, i.e., the interval [0, 28]. Nash
equilibrium is 14 and JPM is 25.5 for both strategic environments and the optimal defection
choice is 18 for complementarity.
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Figure 18. The evolution of choices in pairs under complementarity with communication. Pair
IDs are printed on top of each plot next to if the pair is a JPM pair (1, if not 0), and if the pair
is an early JPM pair (1, if not 0). The definitions of early and eventual JPM pairs are given
in Section 4.3.1. The plots are confined to the strategy space, i.e., the interval [0, 28]. Nash
equilibrium is 14 and JPM is 25.5 for both strategic environments and the optimal defection
choice is 10 for substitution.
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F Further content analysis data
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Figure 19. The ranks of 40 most frequently used words by JPM pairs in both treatments.
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Figure 20. The ranks of 30 most frequently used words by non-JPM pairs in both treatments.
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G STM Specifications
G.1 Removed stopwords
“a, a`, ah, ai, aie, aient, aies, ait, aller, allez, alors, apres, apre`s, as, au, aura, aurai, auraient, aurais,
aurait, auras, aurez, auriez, aurions, aurons, auront, aux, avaient, avais, avait, avec, avez, aviez,
avions, avoir, avons, ayant, ayez, ayons, bah, bjr, bonjour, c, c’est, c’e´tait, ca, c¸a, cb, ce, ceci,
cela, cela`, ces, cest, cet, cette, chose, coup, d, dans, de, des, donc, dsl, du, e, elle, en, es, est, et,
e´taient, e´tais, e´tait, e´tant, e´te´, eˆtes, e´tiez, e´tions, etre, eˆtre, eu, eue, eues, euˆmes, eurent, eus, eusse,
eussen, eusses, eussiez, eussions, eut, euˆt, euˆtes, eux, fai, fair, faire, fais, fait, fuˆmes, furent, fus,
fusse, fussent, fusses, fussiez, fussions, fut, fuˆt, fuˆtes, ici, il, ils, j, j’avais, j’en, je, l, la, la`, le, les,
leur, leurs, lui, m, m’a, m’as, ma, mais, me, meˆme, mes, mis, mm, moi, mon, n, nan, ne, nn, non,
nos, notre, nous, o, ok, on, ont, ou, ouai, ouais, oui, ouii, p, par, pas, pas, peut, pour, pr, q, qu,
qu’il, qu’ils, qu’on, quand, que, quel, quelle, quelles, quels, qui, quoi, quon, re, s, s’il, sa, salut, sans,
se, sera, serai, seraient, serais, serait, seras, serez, seriez, serions, serons, seront, ses, si, sinon, soi,
soient, sois, soit, sommes, son, sont, sous, soyez, soyons, suis, sur, t, t’en, t’es, ta, te, tes, toi, ton,
tous, tout, tres, tre`s, tt, tu, un, une, va, vais, vas, vera, viens, vos, votre, vous, x, xd, y, ya”
G.2 Model Selection
As is necessary for any mixed-membership topic model, STM entails multi-modal estimation that
may depend on starting values of parameters such as the distribution over words for a particular
topic. In this paper we utilize an initialization method that is known as spectral initialization, which
based on the method of moments that is deterministic and globally consistent under reasonable
assumptions (see Arora et al., 2013). Under spectral initialization, the only remaining choice
pertains to the number of topics to estimate, which involves, in general, evaluating outcomes of
estimations for different numbers according to some criteria. In our exercise, we followed the
methodology suggested by Roberts et al. (2019). We paid particular attention to four criteria. The
first one is semantic coherence developed by Mimno et al. (2011), which is maximized when the
most probable words in a given topic frequently co-occur together. As shown by Mimno et al.
(2011), the criterion correlates well with human judgment of topic quality. Formally, let D(v, v′) be
the number of times that words v and v′ appear together in a document. Then given the number of
topics K in the model, for the list of MKk most probable words in topic k, the semantic coherence
for topic k, CKk , is computed as
CKk =
MKk∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
log
(
D(vi, vj) + 1
D(vj)
)
.
Second, it is desirable to have topics that can be distinguishable, i.e., they are exclusive to
topics. For this purpose, another criterion called FREX is proposed by Roberts et al. (2019)
(following Airoldi and Bischof, 2016), which assesses the degree to which high probability words
across topics coincide. FREX, what we denote by φ, is a weighted harmonic mean of the word’s
rank in terms of exclusivity and frequency. Formally,
φKk,v =
(
ω
ECDF (βk,v/
∑K
j=1 βj,v)
+
1− ω
ECDF (βk,v)
)−1
,
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Figure 21. Diagnostics.
where βk,v is the probability of the word v in topic k, ECDF is the empirical CDF, and ω is the
weight given to exclusivity.35 For a topic k, the exclusivity of the topic, φKk , is calculated as the
average of the top MKk words.
A topic that is both cohesive in its words and exclusive is more likely to be semantically relevant.
Furthermore, we check residual dispersion (Taddy, 2012) and held-out likelihood (Wallach et al.,
2009) values. Computing these measures are straightforward within the stm package. Taddy (2012)
proposes the following residual analysis. First, the sample dispersion of the residuals is obtained
by dividing the mean of the squared adjusted residuals by the degrees of freedom parameter, which
itself is obtained by approximating the parameter Nˆ by the number of expected counts exceeding
a tolerance level (set to 100). When the model is correctly specified, the multinomial likelihood
implies that dispersion of residuals is 1. Hence, if the computed sample dispersion is greater than
this, the number of topics might be too low, because the latent topics are not able to account for the
variation. We also computed the document-completion held-out likelihood that is the estimation
of the probability of words being used by a subject when those words have been removed in the
estimation.36 Figure 21 shows relationship between these measures and the number of topics.
We have chosen three topics as this gives the highest semantic coherence without a significant
loss in terms of held-out likelihood. Both the residual analysis and exclusivity naturally point to
higher number of topics. As the residuals constraint can never be satisfied within our topic number
interval, and exclusivity may not be a major concern in a specific context such as our experiment,
we are not worried about the low performance of the three-topic model on these measures. We
believe including more topics in the estimation would not add to our analysis.
35We take ω = 0.7, following Roberts et al. (2019).
3650% of the content of 10% of documents are held out.
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G.3 Estimated topic proportions within pairs
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Figure 22. Estimated topic proportions within pairs in substitution treatment.
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Figure 23. Estimated topic proportions within pairs in complementarity treatment.
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G.4 Chat record examples
1 2 3
0.92 0.03 0.04
Table 9. Estimated topic proportions in Pair 397.
Period Player Message English translation
0 1 bonjour hello
1 1 je propose de choisir 18.0 I propose to choose 18.0
1 2 ca marche alright
2 1 choisir 18.0 choose 18.0
2 2 nous sommes cense´s choisir le mm nombre? Are we suppose to choose the same number ?
2 2 ?? ??
3 1 18.0 18.0
3 2 moi 16 me 16
4 1 ? ?
4 2 je cherche un peu sur le tableau pr voir la meilleure
combinaison pr nous 2
I’m looking a little bit on the table to see the best
combination for us two
4 2 20 pr ns 2 20 for us two
5 2 22 pr nous 2 22 for us two
6 2 tu penses qu on est sur la b onne voie ? Do you think that we’re on right track ?
6 1 OUI YES
6 2 24 pr ns 2 24 for us two
6 1 OK OK
7 2 propose propose
7 1 28.0 POUR NS 28 for us
7 2 ok ok
8 2 26 ? 26 ?
8 1 OK OK
9 1 ON CONTINUE COMME C¸A We keep doing like this
9 2 si tu vx on reste sur le 26 We keep 26 if you want
9 1 OUI YES
9 1 C MIEUX It’s better
9 2 ok ca marche Ok alright
10 -14
15 2 tu penses que c ce qu il faut faire :d ? Do you think that it’s what we have to do ?
15 1 OUI YES
15 1 JE CROIS I THINK
15 2 okk Ok
16 - 19
20 2 c ennuyeux It’s boring
20 1 C VRAI it’s true
21 - 30
Table 10. Chat record of Pair 397 in time order within periods.
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1 2 3
0.05 0.66 0.30
Table 11. Estimated topic proportions in Pair 1393.
Period Player Message English translation
0 2 Bonjour Hello
0 1 bonjour Hello
1 1 faut qu’il y en ai un qui mettre des chiffres entre
18 et 20 et l’autre entre 26 et 28?
There has to be one who puts a number between
18 and 20 and the other between 26 and 28 ?
1 2 J’ai pas trop compris le bus de la boite de dialogue,
je rentre le chois 6.0
I didn’t quite understand the bus (purpose) of the
box of the dialogue, I put in the choice 6.0
1 2 Je ne sais pas I don’t know
2 1 on met quoi, What do we put in ?
2 2 Il faut eˆtre en fonction du tableau pour avoir le
plus de gains possibles c’est ca?
It has to be that accorded to the table, to have the
biggest gain hasn’t it ?
2 2 je mets 26? Do I put in 26 ?
2 1 JE PENSE I THINK
2 1 MOI 24 ME 24
2 1 oklm Cosy
2 2 on brasse Let’s do it
3 2 je mets 28 I put in 28
3 2 c quoi le but de la periode ? What’s the purpose of the period?
3 1 mois 10 month (me) 10
3 1 rien compris je suis a mopins la I don’t understand anything
3 1 moins minus
3 2 moi non mais je comprends pas pq Not me but I don’t understand why
3 1 t’as mis 3 au dernier truc? Did you put 3 in the last thing ?
3 2 oui yes
3 2 et toi and you
3 1 24 24
4 2 moi 13 c ca? me 13 is it ?
4 1 moi 12 me 12
4 1 si tu veux If you want
4 2 ca marche alright
4 2 faut etre en fonction des colonnes donc toi tes hor-
izontale ou verticale ?
We have to be by the columns so are you horizontal
or vertical ?
4 1 je sais pas chacun sa colonne I don’t know each one his column
5 2 on emet tous les deux 28? We both put 28 ?
5 2 met put
5 1 oui on essaye voir c’que ca fait Yes we try to see what it does
5 2 tu veux verticale ou horizontale pour la suite ? Do you want horizontal or vertical for the rest?
5 1 28 tous les deux ca devrait faire 41.27 28 for us two should make 41.27
5 2 c’est bon ca This is good
5 1 c’est pareil mdr j’essaye de comprendre leur truc
la
It’s the same lol I’m trying to understand their
thing now
5 2 moi je comprensd pas I don’t understand it
5 1 j’crois j’comprend kla I think I understand now
Table 12. Chat record of Pair 1393 in time order within periods.
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Period Player Message English translation
6 2 je mets 12 toi 28? I put 12 and you put 28?
6 1 j’ai pris -45 I took -45
6 1 mdrrr lol
6 2 je sais mdr I know lol
6 2 12 48? 12 48?
6 1 les escroc et toi t’as gagne The scammers and you won
6 2 cest ca le style That’s cool
6 1 atyt j’essay un chiffe garde le 28 Wait I try a number, keep the 28
6 2 je mtes 28? Do I put 28?
6 1 oui Yes
7 2 dis moi ton chiffre j’aui du mettre au hasard Tell me your number that I probably put randomly
7 1 mais serieux Seriously
7 2 mdrrrrrr lol
7 2 on met quoi What do we put
7 2 s s
7 2 je te suit I follow you
7 1 j’met 28 met au hasard toi I’m putting 28, you put randomly
7 2 moi je mets 12 I put 12
7 1 ok 12
7 1 j’vais finir a -1000 I am going to end at -1000
7 2 pas beaucoup de sous tout ca That’s not a lot of money
7 2 mdr c toi qui va devoir payer lol it’s you who will have to pay it
8 2 MAIS JE COMPRENDS PAS BUT I DON’T UNDERSTAND
8 2 je mets 22 toi 44 ? I put 22 and you put 44 ?
8 1 j’suis tellement en negatif qu’ils vont me demander
de l’argent a la fin
I am so much in the minus that they will ask me
money at the end
8 2 cest hyper bizarre It’s so strange
8 2 mdrrrr oui c’est c lol yes exactly
8 2 a a
8 1 moi je met 3 I put 3
8 2 mais pq les impairs c pas dans le tableau ? But why aren’t the odd numbers in the table ?
8 1 au point ou j’en suis je tente de toucher le jackpot At the situation I am I’m trying to touch the jack-
pot
9 2 tableauuuuuuu Tableeeeeee
9 1 faut qu’on retente le 12 13 We have to try 12 13 again
9 2 la periode on est d’accord c totalement au hasard
?
We agree that the period is completely random ?
9 1 je met 12 et toi 13 I put 12 and you put 13
9 1 oui yes
9 2 pa 12 et 13 Not 12 and 13
9 2 j’aime pas 13 I dont like 13
9 2 je peux pas mettre 14 ? Can’t I put 14 ?
9 1 si tu veux If you want
9 2 periode au hasard ? random period ?
9 1 quand tu calculs dans leur truc tu gagnes a chauqe
fois et le rien
If you calculate in their thing you win every time
and the nothing
10 2 On essaie meme chiffre meme periode ? Do we try same number same period ?
10 1 j’ai des pointqs!!!!!!! I have points!!!!!
10 2
10 2 BRAVO CONGRATULATION
10 1 oui si tu veux Yes if you want
10 2 on met quoi What do we put
10 1 quel chiffre? Which digit ?
10 1 mdrr meme question lol same question
10 2 26 26
10 1 ok ok
10 2 et periode...... decide and period...... decide
10 1 tu vas gagner des points toi et( moi negatif You are going to win points and (me negative
10 2 si on gagne pas pareil c cheloui If we don’t win in the same way it’s weird
10 2 pourquoi Why
Table 13. Chat record of Pair 1393 in time order within periods.
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Period Player Message English translation
11 2 ok mauvauise technique Okay bad technique
11 2 mdr lol
11 2 je t’e´coute mtnt I’m listening to you now
11 1 STOPPPP STOPPPP
11 2 donne moi tes instructions Give me your instructions
11 1 mais pk tu gagnes toujours et pas moi But why do you always win and not me
11 2 pacq je suis trop fraiche Because I’m too fresh
11 1 meme quand on met les memes resultats moi j’perd
-50 et toi +
Even when we put the same answersI lose -50 and
you +
11 2 trop trop bizarre so so weird
11 1 y a un truc la There’s something here
11 2 je mets quoi tu mets quoi Why do I put and what do you put
11 2 dis moi tell me
11 2 10 sec 10 seconds
11 1 viens on met hasqard Let’s put randomly
12 2 moi je pense c la periode qui fait tout I think that it’s the period which does everything
12 1 et allez encore and again
12 2 le reste c du baratin the others are spiels
12 1 ca change qsuoi la periode What does the period change
12 2 Jsais pas regarde on met les mm chiffres et une
periode diffe´rente
I don’t know look we put the same numbers and a
different period
12 2 re´sultat : t’es en moins result : you are in minus
12 2 moi en plus me in plus
12 2 donc bon... So yes
12 1 vas y on met 10 et 12 Let’s put 10 and 12
12 2 periode : 9 period : 9
12 2 moi 10 me 10
12 1 9 alors 9 then
13 2 ok donc on fait en fonction du tableau Ok so we do based on the table
13 1 t’as mis 9? Did you put 9?
13 2 acvec les meme periodes With the same periods
13 2 oui en periode jai mis 9 yes I put 9 as a period
13 1 on met 10? do we put 10?
13 2 en periode ? as a period ?
13 2 et en chiffre on met 22 22 and as numbers we put 22 22
13 2 ? ?
13 1 on voit ou la periode? where do we see the period?
13 2 c la deuxieme etape it is the second step
13 1 si tu veux if you want
13 2 ok 22 periode 10 ok 22 period 10
13 2 deterr decided
14 2 t’aqs mis la meme periode ????? Did you put the same period ?????
14 1 c’est quoi la periode???? What’s the period????
14 2 la 2e etape la the second step now
14 1 c’est ou que t’ecris la periode?? Where do you write the period??
14 2 jappelle ca periode I call it period
14 2 en haut a droite apres ca On the top at the right after this
14 1 j’ai qu’une etape moi c’est ecrire un chiffre I only have one step and it is to write a number
14 2 oui c ca yes it is that
14 1 moi j’ai ecris 22 c’zest tout I wrote 22 and that’s all
15 1 t’as mis cb? How many did you put?
15 1 moi 14 me 14
15 2 EN FAIT C MIEUX QUAND Y A PAS DE
STRATEGIE ET QU’on met au hasard
ACTUALLY IT’S BETTER WHEN THERE IS
NO STRATEGY AND THAT we put randomly
15 2 moi 10 me 10
15 1 oui voila yes that’s right
15 2 la je mets 26 fais ta life here I put 26 and you do whatever you want
15 1 ok ok
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16 2 jai pas compris I didn’t understand
16 1 hello hello
16 2 salut hi
16 1 on fait notre life mtn we do whatever we want now
16 2 ca marche alright
16 1 c’est cheate´ it is cheating
16 2 je capte rien ca me gave I don’t get anything I’m enough
16 2 encore 1h..... still 1 hour.....
16 1 pareil same
17 1 rien compris I understand nothing
17 2 bah moi non plus well me neither
17 2 mais y a rien a comprendre a mon avis but I think that there’s nothing to understand
17 2 ils testent notre facon de reflechir they are testing our way of thinking
17 2 et la ils captent qu’on est pas tres intelligents and now they understand that we are not very
smart
17 1 mais quand tu fais dans le calculateur de gain ca
donne jamais al meme chose
but when you do in the calculator of the gain it
never gives the same thing
17 2 bah nan c ca qui est bizarre well that’s what’s weird
17 1 c’est quoi le delire laaa What’s the problem hereee
18 2 on fait quoi what do we do
18 2 concretement la concretely now
18 2 ca m’agace it annoys me
18 1 ils ont peur qu’on gagne trop le l’experience est
truque´e mdr
they are afraid that we win too much the experi-
ment is tricked lol
18 2 mdrrrrr c surement ca lol it’s certainly that
18 2 je mets tt le tps pareil mtnt I always put the same now
19 1 gavaoooo I’m enooouugh
19 2 et encore 1h and still 1 hour
19 2 on va se faire 1 euro we are going to make 1 euro
19 1 jamais never
19 2 c cool :) it’s cool
19 2 garrooooo
19 1 t’facon ils vont me demander de l’argent avec mon
score negatif j’me barre en courant
they are going to ask me money anyway with my
minus score I will run to escape
19 2 mdrrrr la fuite lol the escape
20 2 dans les previsions ils disaient que j’avais 20 points
et toi 18
In the previsions they were saying that I had 20
points and you 18
20 2 bah que dal well nothing
20 2 donc nashav so a lie
20 1 fakeeee fake
20 1 18 18
20 1 et 18 and 18
20 2 oki ok
21 2 28 28 28 28
21 1 pk ca a marche la???????????????? why does it work now???????????
21 1 non 20 et 20 no 20 and 20
21 2 26 26 meˆme 26 26 same
21 2 ok ok
21 2 28 28 ca fait plus de points 28 28 it makes more points
21 1 mdrrrrrrr 28 caz porte malheur depuis le debut lol 28 is bad luck from the beginning
21 2 mdrrrr j’avoue lol it’s true
21 1 20
21 2 donc 20 so 20
21 1 yessssss yes
21 2 mais je viens de coprendre en fait wait I just understood now actually
22 2 test 28 28 try 28 28
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23 2 28 le sang 28 the life
23 1 on prend les memes et on recommence we take the same and we do it again
23 2 que 28 only 28
23 2 c le meilleur it’s the best
23 2 ca fait 41 points it makes 41 points
23 2 on aurait du faire ca depuis le de´but we should’ve done this since the beginning
23 1 oui yes
24 1 same same
24 2 c le best it’s the best
24 2 tu vois ca porte pas malheur see it’s bad luck
24 2 plus que 6 etapes only 6 steps left
24 2 allelujah hallelujah
24 1 gogoggogogogo go
25 1 26? 26?
25 2 bah nan c pas equitable quand on met pas les
meˆmes nombres
well no because it’s not even if we don’t put the
same numbers
25 1 26 et 26 26 and 26
25 2 genre si je mets 20 toi 26 jai 60 pointe et toi 14 if I put 20 and you 26 I get 60 points and you 14
25 2 on va gagner moins que 28 avec 26 we will win less than 28 with 26
25 2 donc restons sur 28 so let’s stay on 28
25 1 o o
26 2 a coup de -60 pour toi au de´but so -60 for you at the beginning
26 2 on est de´biles we are stupid
26 2 on aurait du garder 28 we should’ve kept 28
26 1 ouiiiiiii yeeees
26 2 dans tous les cas ca va nous payer le paquet de
garr
it’ll pay us the packet of Garr anyway
27 1 xd lol
27 2 XHD meˆme same
27 1 ca va meme pas me payer le paquet de garr stp it won’t even pay me the packet of gar
27 2 mais si yes it will
27 2 t’as cash 5 euros do you have 5 euros in cash
27 2 et t’zuras bien gagne´ 2 euros and you would have well won 2 euros
27 1 non j’ai pris trop de malus au debut no I took so many bad things at the beginning
27 2 ah oui merde oh yes sh*t
27 2
27 2
27 2 moi j’en ai presque pas eu en scred I got almost nothing in secret
27 2 mais je sais pas pq but I don’t know why
27 1 non ils vont me raquetter a la fin avec tous les
moins que j’ai eu
no they will ask me for money with all the minus
I got
28 1 en vrai j’espere prochaine experience c’est indi-
viduel
actually I hope that the next experiment will be
individual
28 2 mdr pourquoi lol why
28 1 et pas avec des chiffres tout mort and without dead numbers
28 2 ah oui ah yes
28 2 trop bizarreeeee so weird
28 2 ca me laisse perplexe leurs logiciels la their software leaves me confused
28 1 parceque tout seul au moins jt’e ferais pas perdre
de love´s
because alone I won’t make you lose
28 2 :$ :$
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29 2 2 se´ances et basta two sessions and that’s all
29 2 gavao a max let’s do it
29 1 on finis sur les chapeaux de roues we end on a good way
29 2 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 8 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 8 28
29 2 nsm
29 1 prochainer seance je fais peter la banque mdrr in the next session I will make the bank explode
29 2 mdrrrrr voila yes that’s it
29 2 q15 euros minimum q 15 euros minimum
29 2 LOL LOL
29 1 minimum le mimi prochaine seance the next little session at least
30 2 THE LAST ONE THE LAST ONE
30 2 YEAH YEAH
30 1 prochaine seance minimum 2 paquet de garro the next session minimum 2 packets of garro
30 1 enfinnnnnn fini finally finished
30 2 mdr c’est l’objectif lol it’t the objective
30 1 yes paquet souple biensur yes a flexible packet of course
30 2 tu penses y a des strategies ? do you think there’s strategy ?
30 2 mdr pour avoir la classe lol to be cool
30 1 pour faire l’bg to act the cool guy
30 1 non y a rien j’pense dfaut etrze bete etr discipline no there’s nothing I think we have to be stupid
and have discipline
30 1 et travauiller en equipe and work with the team
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Table 18. Estimated topic proportions in Pair 595.
Period Player Message English translation
0 1 bonjour hello
0 2 bonjour hello
1 1 tu veux prendre quel chifffre which number do you want to take
1 2 il faut faire quoi la` ? what do we have to do here ?
1 1 tape 28 pat in 28
1 1 fait moi confiance trust me
2 1 ta vu on a gagne tout les deux 40 centimes you see we win both 40 cents
2 2 on continu comme c¸a tout le long ? we keep doing like this all along ?
2 1 continue de tape 28 keep putting 28 in
2 2 d’acc okay
2 1 oui a la fin en tout on aura chacun 14euros yes at the end we will have both 14 euros
2 2 ok ok
2 1 ok ok
3
4 1 cette fois ci tape 26.0 this time put 26 in
4 1 on aura chacun encore plus we will both have even more
4 2 si on met tout les deux 26 on gagne plus if we put both 26 we will win more
4 1 on va passe de 41.27 a` 41.97 we are going to go from 41.27 to 41.97
4 2 ah bin voila` on a vu la meˆme chose ah yes we saw the same thing
4 1 oui ok yes ok
5 - 8
9 1 c trooooooooooop long la ... it’s too long ...
9 2 ouais c¸a m’a soule´ !! yes it annoys me
9 2 mdr lol
9 1 ennuie....... bored
9 1 lol lol
9 2 on est seulement au tiers en plus and we are only at one-third
10 1 jai pas eu le temps de lire ce que tu a ecrit tout a
l’heur?
I didn’t have time to read what you wrote earlier
10 2 qen plus on a fait seulement un tiers q and even more that we have only done one-third
11 1 oui seulement 1/3... yes only 1/3
11 1 pour la derniere partie trahis pas ton amie virtuel
du jour mdr
for the last game where you have been betrayed
by your virtual friend lol
11 2 mdr lol
11 2 pareil pour toi... same for you...
12 1 non pour 20centimes en plus sa se fait pas je pref-
ere que
no for 20 cents that’s just wrong I prefer that
12 1 l’on gagne tout les deux 40 centimes we both win 40 cents
13 2 ouais c¸a sert a` rien yes it’s no use
13 1 oe lol yes lol
13 2 et en plus c¸a fait perdre des sous a` l’autre and even you can’t make the other loose money
13 1 oui en effet yes exactly
14
15 2 −−
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16 - 20
21 2 J’ai l’impression que c¸a fait 3 heures qu’on est
dessus
I feel like it has been 3 hours since we started this
22 - 24
25 1 plus que 6 parties ! only 6 sessions left !
25 2 enfin ! finally !
25 2 je m’endors I’m falling asleep
25 1 continue a dormire alors mdr keep sleeping then
25 2 mdr lol
26 1 c’est domage que l’experience est aussi longue
sinon elle est tres interressante
it’s unfortunate that this experiment is that long
but apart from that it’s interesting
26 2 ouais c’est vrai yes true
26 2 c’est ta premie`re ? Is it your first one ?
26 1 non du tout not at all
27 2 c¸a te fait combien de fois alors? How many times have you done it then?
28 1 6/7 fois je crois et toi ? 6/7 times I think and you ?
28 2 ah ouais quand meˆme oh wow
28 2 moi c’est ma premie`re me it’s my first time
28 1 tu t’en sort bien pour un nouveau lol you do it well for a new arrival
28 2 et a` chaque fois tu fais cette strate´gie ? and you do this strategy every time ?
29 2 Je te fais confiance hein... I trust you ok...
29 1 oui j’adopte toujours la strategie de q je fais 50/50
avec
Yes I always use the strategy when I do 50/50 with
29 1 l’autre q je trouve que c la meilleur the other I think is the best
29 1 apres t pas toujours avec d gens desfois c avec l’ordi you are not always with other people sometimes
you are with computers
29 2 ouais c’est suˆr yes it’s true
29 1 oui tkt yes don’t worry
29 2 ah bon ? is that so ?
30 1 sa a etait un plaisir de jouer avec toi mdrr it was a pleasure to play with you lol
30 2 mdr lol
30 2 Un plaisir pour moi aussi it was a pleasure for me too
30 1 bonne continuation good luck
30 2 toi aussi ;-) you too
30 1 enrevoir lol goodbye lol
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